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he Riga Summit of 21-22 May 2015 reaffirmed the EU’s commitment to the Eastern 
Partnership, underlined further differentiation between the neighbours and reiterated 
the importance of people-to-people contacts. The Summit also offered support to 
eastern neighbours in the face of Russian pressure and to assist them in their implementation 
of the Association Agreements and the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements 
(DCFTAs). It also restated the goal of seeking a more tailor-made relationship with non-
Association Agreement countries. Whilst the Riga Summit did not produce any 
breakthrough on visa-free travel for Georgians and Ukrainians, it did preserve the 
commitments already made at the Vilnius Summit by the EU to its eastern neighbours. All in 
all, the Summit was more of a stocktaking exercise than a momentous redefinition of 
relations with the EU at a time of precarious geopolitics in the east. 
In the lead-up to the Riga Summit and in the midst of the Ukraine crisis and mounting 
insecurity in the EU’s southern neighbourhood, the High Representative of the Union for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Federica Mogherini, and the Commissioner for the 
Neighbourhood, Johannes Hahn were prompted to initiate a review of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), 12 years after its inception.1 Despite no shortage of questions 
put forward by the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the Commission in the 
consultation paper, the lessons offered by the Eastern Partnership Summit at Riga for the 
review of the ENP writ large are rather modest. This commentary will focus on these lessons. 
Keep the ENP ‘chapeau’ 
The EU should keep the ENP as a common platform, while acknowledging that there is 
indeed little in common between the EU’s southern and eastern neighbourhoods. Moreover, 
while some member states focus more on the Eastern Partnership, i.e., Poland, the Baltic 
states, and Sweden, others, namely Italy, Spain, and France, place more emphasis on 
cooperation with the southern neighbourhood. Dividing the ENP is likely to divide the 
                                                   
1 European Commission, “Towards a new European Neighbourhood Policy: the EU launches a 
consultation on the future of its relations with neighbouring countries”, IP/4548, 4 March 2015. 
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member states themselves, thereby jeopardising any future consensus. It is notable that since 
the start of the Ukraine crisis, the Eastern Partnership has faced, and so far successfully 
overcome, the challenge of sustaining unity and solidarity among the EU member states.  
Yet keeping the ENP as a common platform should not prevent the EU from responding to 
the needs of individual regions and countries. What needs to be eliminated from the ENP is 
the tendency to offer a one-size-fits-all package to both eastern and southern neighbours.  
Smart implementation of Association Agreements  
Although the review solicits ideas on how to make the ENP more flexible and diversified, 
this approach is not in line with the Association Agreements and the DCFTAs. Substantively, 
it will not be possible to radically reframe the EU’s relations with Ukraine, Moldova and 
Georgia. Instead, the focus should be on the smart implementation of regulations and 
directives included in the Association Agreements and the DCFTA2 – going beyond 
bureaucratic automatism and mere cost-benefit analysis. The implementation should also 
take into account the political, economic and social context at both local and regional levels, 
and use the flexibility allowed by the different time schedules for implementation.  
The EU can incentivise the implementation of the Association Agreements through financial 
and technical support, which is indispensable for the process. Yet any successful 
implementation of agreements requires that domestic elites do their homework and root out 
systemic corruption. Commenting on corruption, one EU diplomat stated: “When you look 
at Moldova, you do not know where to start”. A handful of oligarchs govern the country 
through their political appointees and have little interest in reform because they are the 
prime beneficiaries of the status quo. Being in a state of war and under dire microeconomic 
constraints, the process of reform is extremely complicated for Ukraine as well.  
The EU should work to strengthen the reformist constituency in all Eastern Partnership 
countries and not shy away from criticising the political-economic elites. The EU’s natural 
counterparts remain countries with a strong public administration, a healthy private sector 
and a vibrant civil society. The reformist constituency and the citizens of the Association 
Agreement countries should be aware that closer association with the EU means thoroughly 
reforming their administration, legislation, economy and body politic. 
Tailor-made but consistent with the non-associated states 
Signing the Association Agreements introduced long-awaited diversification into the Eastern 
Partnership. There is now a need for further diversification among the group of non-
Association Agreement countries because levels of motivation and ambition to cooperate 
with the EU vary across Armenia, Azerbaijan and Belarus. Having no obligation to 
approximate to the EU allows for relationships that are tailor-made and flexible.  
Among the non-DCFTA Eastern Partnership countries, Armenia has been most affected by 
the geopolitical struggle on the European continent and has had to give up its Association 
Agreement. Nevertheless, in March 2015 the EU and Armenia successfully completed the so-
called ‘scoping exercise’ to identify the legal ground for a future agreement. The European 
Council is expected to grant the Commission with a mandate shortly for negotiation of an 
‘Enhanced Partnership Agreement’, which – like the one with Kazakhstan – will be a test 
case for a member of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) to seek closer ties with the EU.  
While demonstrating no interest in the Association Agreement, Azerbaijan sought a kind of 
‘Strategic Dialogue’ with the EU that is free of the conditionality that underpins the Eastern 
                                                   
2 These number 302 for Georgia, 333 for Ukraine and 407 for Moldova. 
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Partnership. On the eve of the Riga Summit, the Azeri foreign minister submitted a position 
paper setting out the aspirations of Baku for this partnership with the EU. While the EU 
should pursue the possibility of new tailor-made bilateral relations with Azerbaijan, it 
should not turn a blind eye to the Azeri authorities using the geopolitical context to further 
repress critics of the regime.  
The absence of Belarus President Alexander Lukashenko at the Riga Summit (despite the 
interest he expressed in participating in the Summit) stands in contrast to the invitation that 
was extended to Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev (although Aliyev did not attend the 
Summit). The EU ruled out an invitation to Lukashenko on the grounds that there are “four 
political prisoners in Belarus”.3 So not only did the EU demonstrate double standards and 
undermine its credibility in the region, it also failed to use the window of opportunity that 
was opened with Belarus. The Riga Summit was thus quite consistent with the EU’s 
longstanding inconsistency vis-à-vis its eastern neighbours: it sanctioned Belarus but not 
Azerbaijan.  
The Russian challenge 
The Commission’s acknowledgement in the consultation paper of the need to deal with the 
‘neighbours of the neighbours’ is something of a novelty. Neither the ENP nor the Eastern 
Partnership has thus far accounted for the links between Russia and its eastern neighbours. 
Meanwhile, in recent years, Russia actively used the economic, energy, military and cultural 
ties with countries in the EU-Russia common neighbourhood to act as a spoiler of the Eastern 
Partnership. Moreover, when faced with hard military challenges such as those in Ukraine, 
the Eastern Partnership has proved to be a rather unsuitable instrument. 
The EU supports the Minsk II agreement and facilitates trilateral talks on the EU-Ukrainian 
DCFTA. It would also be advisable for the EU to consider opening technical talks with the 
Eurasian Economic Union. Indeed, the EAEU is a weak and dysfunctional union, wholly 
dominated by Russia. But it has seriously impacted most of the countries in the EU-Russia 
common neighbourhood and Central Asia. The EAEU is therefore a reality and should not be 
ignored by the EU. Although talks are unlikely to deliver immediate results on difficult 
issues, they are important to the process. Moreover, discussing trade-related matters with the 
EAEU as an entity is more advantageous than with Russia alone. It will also give space to 
Armenia and Belarus to take part in the process. Otherwise, if the EU decides to hold free- 
trade talks bilaterally with Russia, the decisions will merely be imposed on the EAEU 
members. 
Conclusions 
Judging by the outcome of the Eastern Partnership Summit at Riga, we should not expect too 
much of the ENP review. The review is unlikely to fundamentally alter the EU’s relations 
with Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia, which are governed by the Association Agreement. 
More differentiation and consistency should be introduced into the EU’s relations with non-
associated countries, without abandoning the Union’s normative agenda. Politically, it is 
important now for the EU to defend what it already offered to the eastern neighbours and 
reconfirm the European Neighbourhood Policy as fundamental to the EU’s rethink of its 
larger Security Strategy. 
                                                   
3 According to one EU diplomat. 
